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I. INTRODUCTION
Today’s submarine pipelines and cables form modern sea lines of
communication with important implications for global economic and
maritime security.1  This vital infrastructure is designed to be resilient;
however, stability rests on international cooperation and law.  Continued 
advances in international communications and energy exploration hinge
on international legal standards that protect private investors (i.e., 
companies who build, maintain and operate underwater networks) from 
untoward acts. 
A gap in legal protection for subsea pipelines and cables outside
territorial waters could be exploited by undersea malfeasance.  This is 
because trends in commercial undersea technologies are greatly expanding 
the size and sensitivity of the undersea “target set.”  As the economic 
significance of this critical infrastructure grows, so does the motivation 
to hold it at risk.  This symbiotic evolution of technological capabilities
and undersea targets grows more acute as offshore infrastructure moves 
into deeper and deeper water. And while legal regimes in place today
afford some protection to infrastructure above the waterline, they fall 
short of protecting from ambiguous attack below. 
This article explores the vulnerability of submarine pipelines and 
cables to underwater subterfuge beyond territorial waters, particularly
with regards to the emerging threat posed by unmanned vehicles in
executing such mal intent.  Next, it describes the legal status of this
critical infrastructure before identifying shortcomings in legal protection 
from underwater attack. Finally, potential solutions are offered for the 
way forward. 
1. Scott Coffen-Smout & Glen J. Herbert, Submarine Cables: A Challenge for 
Ocean Management, 24 MARINE POL’Y 441, 442 (2000). 
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II. THE VULNERABILITY: CRITICAL UNDERSEA INFRASTRUCTURE
A. Oil and Natural Gas Pipelines 
The world’s biggest marine industry is offshore oil and natural gas— 
with oil production alone amounting to more than $300 billion per year.2 
Subsea3 oil and gas markets have grown by more than 90% in the last 
five years and are projected to remain “very strong for the foreseeable
future.”4  The commercial undersea energy infrastructure (UEI) that
brings these energy resources to market includes: offshore rigs and
platforms; floating storage, processing, and handling facilities; wells;
and offshore handling terminals. 
Subsea pipelines serve as the backbone for all this UEI.5  They  
connect increasingly complex floating production networks as well as 
2. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: Hearing on T. Doc. No. 
103-39 Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of
Paul L. Kelly, Senior Vice President of Rowan Companies, Inc., on behalf of the American
Petroleum Institute, the International Association of Drilling Contractors, and the National 
Ocean Industries Association), available at http://lugar.senate.gov/issues/foreign/pdf/sea/
seareport.pdf at 117.
3. The term “subsea” is commonly used by the undersea oil and gas industry to 
identify assets and activities that utilize the sea floor. See, e.g., www.subsea.org.
4. Subsea Market to Remain Strong, SUBSEA WORLD, Feb. 12, 2008, http://www. 
subseaworld.com/news (search “Subsea Market”; then select “Subsea Market to Remain 
Strong” hyperlink) (last visited June 6, 2010).  Traditional oil producing basins have 
matured, particularly on land, and exploration and production companies have been 
forced to look for new reserves in ever more challenging deepwater environments off the 
Coast of Africa and beyond the Continental Shelf in the Gulf of Mexico to maintain 
production and profits.  Between 2006 and April 2010, the number of deepwater rigs 
grew 43% in the Gulf of Mexico region. See Ben Casselman et al., Blast Jolts Oil World, 
WALL ST. J., Apr. 22, 2010, at A1, A4.  Oil produced from these rigs has played an
important role—the Gulf of Mexico produces 30% of the U.S. oil output and is an 
important source of revenue for oil majors like BP. See id. at A4.  Worldwide, oil production 
at deepwater projects—those in waters at least 1,000 feet deep—grew 67%, or about 2.3 
million barrels a day, between 2005 and 2008, which accounts for about 8% of global
production. See id.   In fact, so imperative is offshore drilling as a viable alternative to 
reliance on foreign oil imports, that the U.S. Export-Import Bank made a preliminary
commitment of $2 billion in August 2009 to Petrobas of Brazil (at best, a lukewarm ally
in the Americas) to finance the development of its Tupi fields.  Review & Outlook, 
Obama Underwrites Offshore Drilling, WALL ST. J., Aug. 18, 2009, at A16. 
5. Worldwide total offshore pipeline construction was 12,685 miles in 2008. 
Bruce Beaubouef, Offshore Pipeline Construction Review, PIPELINE & GAS TECH., Apr. 
1, 2008, http://www.pipelineandgastechnology.com/Construction/ForecastsReviews/item55721.
php (last visited June 6, 2010).  In the North Sea alone, there are now more than 100,000
kilometers of pipeline.  See Daniel Esser, METS—The Tool for Pipeline Inspection, SEA
TECH., Apr. 2002, at 51.  One 23.1-kilometer North Sea pipeline, the Tampen Link gas 
 225
















    
 




   
 
   
 
  




   
 
     
   
 
 
   
  
vast subsea networks that directly feed ashore.6  And ostensibly, they
protect critical hardware from storms and terrorists too.7 
All these new kilometers of piping coincide with the growing sensitivity 
of energy prices to supply disruption.8 Factors mitigating the risk of
untoward attack include robust pipeline construction with steel and
concrete to withstand incidental impact from ship’s anchors, frequent 
burial six to seven feet below the silt, and the increasingly interconnected
pipeline, exemplifies this increasingly indispensable role; it connects Norway’s Statfjord 
oil and gas field to the United Kingdom (U.K.), which increases Norway’s ability to export 
gas to the U.K. by 25 million cubic meters per day. See Nina Berglund, New Pipeline
Opens, AFTENPOSTEN, Oct. 15, 2007, available at http://www.aftenposten.no/english/ 
business/article2048659.ece. 
The breadth and depth of UEI development in the Gulf of Mexico, where the lion’s 
share of U.S. domestic crude oil supply is extracted, is also illustrative of worldwide trends. 
For example, the Gulfstream Natural Gas System pipeline runs 691 miles under the Gulf
from Alabama to a growing consumer base in central Florida.  Also, Thunder Horse oil 
field is located 125 miles offshore and in 6,000 feet of water.  And now, drilling depths 
greater than 10,000 feet have become economically feasible as terrestrial supplies of oil 
and gas fail to satiate rising global demand.  See Jad Mouawad, Going Deep; The Gulf of 
Mexico Holds a Lot of Oil, but Recovering It Isn’t Easy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2006, at
C1. See also Russell Gold, BP’s Big Oil Find Cements Gulf’s Revival, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3,
2009, at B1, B2 (many of these oil reserves are located in the Gulf’s lower tertiary more 
than two miles below sea level and require expensive equipment to drill). 
This ultra-deep water drilling, in turn, adds significant UEI inventory.  Remotely Operated 
Vehicles assemble new seabed wells that then drill 30,000 feet below the seabed.  See
Amanda Griscom Little, Pumped Up: Chevron Drills Down 30,000 Feet to Tap Oil-Rich 
Gulf of Mexico, WIRED.COM, Aug. 21, 2007, http://www.wired.com/cars/energy/magazine/
15-09/mf_jackrig  (last visited June 6, 2010).  Oil is then ported back from the 10,000-foot 
deep wellhead to floating storage, production, and offloading (FSPO) systems connected
by networks of tiebacks, flowlines and risers—all pipelines.  Similar FSPO operations
off the coast of Brazil and West Africa tie as many as 40 to 55 subsea wells to one or two
platforms using hundreds of kilometers of flow lines and risers. 
Companies like BP, Marathon Oil, and Royal Dutch Shell increasingly rely on this
method of subsea tiebacks to reuse old deepwater infrastructure and pump oil from 
smaller sized satellite fields.  Russell Gold, BP Drilling Platform Reaches Far Afield, WALL 
ST. J., May 5, 2009 (Business Section), available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124 
155530486688737.html.  By pumping oil from these far away deposits into already built 
platforms, they bypass the need to build additional rigs, which are expensive to construct
and maintain. See id.  Since the beginning of 2008, six new deepwater tiebacks have begun 
pumping, and an additional 23 tiebacks are in development and expected to be operational 
before the end of 2011.  See id.
6. The Snøhvit development is the first on the Norwegian outer continental shelf
with neither fixed nor floating units.  It will pump from 140 kilometers offshore, in 250–
354 meters of water, via pipelines to production facilities ashore. See Facts about Snøhvit, 
STATOIL.COM, http://www.statoil.com/en/OurOperations/ExplorationProd/ncs/snoehvit/Pages/
default.aspx (last visited June 6, 2010).  Likewise, technological advances in the Gulf of
Mexico now enable wellheads far at sea to directly feed ashore.  Piping larger proportions of
total production in this manner further intensifies the breadth of undersea piping. 
7. See Russell Gold & Ana Campoy, Wells Take Voyage to Bottom of the Sea, 
WALL ST. J., July 26, 2007, at B1, B6. 
8. See INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK, 37–39 (2006). 
226
WRATHALL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/9/2010 3:20 PM     
 

















   
    
 
 









[VOL. 12:  223, 2010] The Vulnerability of Subsea Infrastructure 
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
nature of world energy markets.9  These factors suggest that any attempt
to disrupt pipeline operations would require a large, coordinated attack
or precise insider knowledge of weak links, as well as the ability to 
absorb higher energy commodity prices.
B. Telecommunication Cables 
Submarine telecommunication cables provide the “worldwide” part of
the worldwide web and are the largest marine business after offshore
energy extraction, global shipping, and naval expenditures.10  Fiber optic 
cables were introduced in the 1980s,11 and have since become
indispensable arteries for the world’s information lifeblood.12  The heart 
of these cables is a set of six to twenty-four glass fibers, each the width
of a human hair.13  Lasers shoot pulses of light through these glass 
fibers, generating tens of thousands of communication circuits.14  Even 
with additional shielding of copper, aluminum, polycarbonate, stranded 
steel wires, mylar, and polyethylene, cables typically span less than two 
inches in diameter.15
 9. See Howie Doyle & Susan Troscinski, Subsea Pipelines: From Survey to Start-Up
New Technologies Conquer the Ocean Deep, UNDERWATER MAG., Fall 1997, available 
at http://www.underwater.com/archives/arch/uw-fa97.02.htm.  See also Magne Torhaug,
Petroleum Supply Vulnerability Due to Terrorism at North Sea Oil and Gas Infrastructures,
in  PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE FROM ACTS OF TERRORISM 77–78 (K.V. 
Frolov & G.B. Baecher eds., 2006).
10. Statement of Paul L. Kelly, supra note 2, at 1.
11. Coaxial cables were laid between 1950 and 1988; only a few are still used today.
See Fishing and Submarine Cables: Working Together, INTERNATIONAL CABLE PROTECTION 
COMMITTEE [hereinafter ICPC] (2d ed.), Feb. 23, 2009, at 8, available at www.iscpc.org 
(select “Publications” tab, then select “Fishing and Cables”).
12. See Accession to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and
Ratification of the 1994 Agreement Regarding Part XI of the Convention: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Douglas R. 
Burnett, Int’l Cable Law Advisor and Partner, Holland & Knight LLP). 
13. Fishing and Submarine Cables, supra note 11, at 9.
 14. In 1958, Transatlantic Telephone [TAT] 1, the first transoceanic telephone 
cable, had 32 circuits.  In 1979, TAT-7, the last analog cable, had 4200 circuits.  Now, the 
Transpacific Express [TPE] cable system, a fiber optic undersea cable, has capacity equivalent
to 62,000,000 circuits or simultaneous telephone conversations.  See Statement of Douglas R.
Burnett, supra note 12, at note 5. 
15. See Fishing and Submarine Cables, supra note 11, at 9.  See Submarine 
Communications Cable, WIKIPEDIA (July 26, 2010 3:51PM), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Submarine_communications_cable, for a cross section of a submarine communications cable. 
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Owing to their lower cost and longer lifespan, submarine cables have 
surpassed satellites as the principal means of delivering international
telecommunications traffic.16  Swelling demand for bandwidth generated
by the Internet and corporate data traffic, abetted by privatization of 
national telecommunication industries and private investment in
submarine cables, has increased reliance on these undersea networks.17 
In fact, undersea cables carry over 95% of the world’s (and 70% of U.S.) 
international voice, data, and video traffic, including almost 100% of 
transoceanic Internet ocean traffic.18  There is insufficient satellite 
bandwidth to back up cable communications should they be lost.19 
Despite the predominant use of fiber-optic cables for switched voice, 
private line services, and increasingly, the transmission of video signals, 
new scientific sources of demand for high-bandwidth global connectivity
are also rising.20  The high-energy physics research community has
attempted to link scientists around the world to enable international
collaboration on data-intensive projects.21  Another emerging scientific
16. See Coffen-Smout & Herbert, supra note 1, at 441. 
17. Two distinct technological convergences have caused the proliferation of fiber-
optic cables: (1) the blurring of point-to-point communication and broadcasting; and (2) 
the convergence of telecommunications, computing, and entertainment into a common digital 
form. See Edward J. Malecki & Hu Wei, A Wired World: The Evolving Geography of
Submarine Cables and the Shift to Asia, 99 ANNALS OF THE ASS’N OF AM. GEOGRAPHERS
360, 362 (2009). There are over 76 international cable networks of various sizes, owned 
by a consortium of private carriers.  See James Jay Carafano & Alane Kochems, Making
the Sea Safer: A National Agenda for Maritime Security and Counterterrorism, HERITAGE 
FOUND., Special Report No. 38 (Feb. 17, 2005), available at http://www.heritage.org/
Research/Reports/2005/02/Making-the-Sea-Safer-A-NationalAgenda-for-Maritime-Security-
and-Counterterrorism.  See also Telegeography, http://www.telegeography.com/product-info/ 
map_cable/index.php (last visited Nov. 3, 2010) for a submarine cable map of the world, 
and infra Attachment A (2009 variant of the map).  Thirty of these cables land on the
shores of ten U.S. coastal states: eleven in the Northeast (Rhode Island, Massachusetts,
New York and New Jersey), eleven in Florida or Puerto Rico, and eight on the West Coast 
(California, Oregon, Alaska, Washington and Hawaii).  Two new Pacific Ocean systems, 
each costing about half a billion dollars, will better connect the U.S. to Asia: the 10,800-
mile TPE, discussed in the Statement of Douglas R. Burnett, supra note 12, connects the 
U.S. from Oregon to China, Korea and Taiwan; the 12,000-mile Asia-America Gateway
cable system connects California, Hawaii, and Guam with Hong Kong, Malaysia, Thailand, 
Singapore, Vietnam, the Philippines and Brunei.  Moreover, the BP Gulf of Mexico system, 
which will connect seven offshore production platforms, portends remote, continuous
operations from control centers ashore, impervious to hurricanes. See Statement of Douglas 
R. Burnett, supra note 12. 
18. See About Submarine Telecommunication Cables, ICPC, http://www.iscpc.
org/publications/About_Cables_in_PDF_Format.pdf (last visited August 12, 2010). 
19. See Carafano & Kochems, supra note 17, at 8. 
20. See Malecki & Wei, supra note 17, at 364. 
21. See id. For example, the authors mention the push to upgrade by the Standing
Committee on Interregional Connectivity of the International Committee for Future
Accelerators (ICFA-SCIC) at the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN).
228
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application for submarine cables is undersea oceanographic research.22 
And the growing use of digital technologies in oil and gas exploration
provides yet another market.23 
While submarine fiber optic cables offer a number of security
advantages over satellite communications (like less susceptibility to 
service disruptions during storms, greater barriers to eavesdropping, and
more dependable installation and repair practices), they are nevertheless
vulnerable to anthropogenic and natural disasters. Ship anchors and 
dredging fishing nets are two of the most common.24  Earthquakes and
shark bites—and hostile action—can also cut cables or bend them so
severely that fibers crack and signals are lost.25 Consequently, to 
improve their survivability, cables are often buried two to three feet in
the seabed in water depths shallower than 2,000 meters.26  And as fishing 
trawlers move into deeper waters, this burial may correspondingly 
increase.27 
Intentional disruption of what has become the central nervous system 
of the global economy could cause significant harm to a wide range of 
international actors.28  Impediments to the flow of real-time data for
financial markets or to sensitive military communications that increasingly 
utilize the same infrastructure could spark widespread panic.29  However,  
22. See id. at 365.  For example, the authors list the European Sea Floor Observatory
Network (ESONET) and the North-East Pacific Time-integrated Undersea Networked 
Experiments (NEPTUNE). 
23. See id. The authors describe how early three- and four-dimensional 
seismic visualization has greatly increased the success of drilling and exploration.  Also, as
offshore oil and gas fields are increasingly linked to onshore operations centers, “concerns 
about security from terrorist threats to oil facilities have pushed applications for remote 
access and control of high-resolution video, radar, and other surveillance systems beyond
the capabilities of satellite communications.”
24. See FRANK W. LACROIX ET AL., Submarine Cable Infrastructure, in A CONCEPT
OF OPERATIONS FOR A NEW DEEP-DIVING SUBMARINE 140 (RAND Corp. 2001). See also
About Submarine Telecommunication Cables, supra note 18. 
25. In very deep water, cables are not necessarily armored, which reduces their weight 
and cost. 
26. See About Submarine Telecommunication Cables, supra note 18. 
27. See id.
28. See LACROIX, supra note 24, at 139–49.  The threat of such disruption is as old
as submarine cables themselves. A fisherman in 1850, thinking he had discovered a new 
species of seaweed, cut the first submarine telegraph cable (Dover to Calais) just a few
days after it was inaugurated.  See Coffen-Smout & Herbert, supra note 1, at 442. 
29. See, e.g., Richard Stiennon, Richard Clarke on Recent Mideast Cable Outages, 
THREAT CHAOS (Feb. 6, 2008), http://blogs.zdnet.com/threatchaos/?p=528 (interview with the
chief counter-terrorism adviser on President Bill Clinton’s U.S. National Security Council 
 229
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as with undersea pipelines, self-deterrence is a significant factor
militating against deliberate attack or sabotage on undersea cables.
Because of the proliferation of civic services and interdependent 
functions that the Internet and telecommunications support around the
world, it would be difficult for a saboteur to escape injury to their own 
organization or country.
C. Electricity Cables 
Besides telecommunication cables, underwater power cables are 
becoming increasingly critical.  For example, the Juan de Fuca Cable 
Project proposes to use an international electrical cable from Canada to 
Washington State.30  There have been similar plans for a power cable 
from Canada to Boston and New York.31 And now, with the anticipation 
of a green revolution in harvesting alternative energies, submarine
electricity cables are likely to gain prominence as umbilical cords to 
future offshore energy parks.32 
D. Collective Dim Mak Points33 
Subsea pipelines, telecommunication, and power cables are critical,
but vulnerable infrastructures.34  They are targets for location-based 
and author of BREAKPOINT, a fictional account about a series of attacks on U.S. infrastructure
that start with simultaneous bombings of several beach heads for the main trans-Atlantic
fiber cables and undersea cuttings of the same fibers). 
30. See News Release, Sea Breeze Power Corp., Juan de Fuca Transmission
Cable–Presidential Permit Application, (February 23, 2005), available at http://www.
jdfcable.com/downloads/05-02-23.pdf (last visited June 6, 2010). 
31. See Andrew Caffrey, 4,800 Megawatts Under the Sea? Jules Verne-esque Idea 
to Import Power, WALL ST. J., May 23, 2001, at B1, B12. 
32. See Emily Waltz, Offshore Wind May Power the Future, SCIENTIFIC 
AMERICAN.COM. (Oct. 20, 2008), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=offshore 
-wind-may-power-the-future (describing proposed wind farm sixteen miles off the New 
Jersey shore).  Long transmission lines would run from such deepwater farms. 
33. See generally Victor Corpus, AMERICA’S DIM MAK POINTS: UNRESTRICTED
WARFARE IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2009) (comparing vital yet vulnerable diplomatic, military
and economic points to ancient Chinese acupuncture points called Dim Mak, which when hit
in a specific way at certain times of the day, can cause paralysis or instant death). 
34. Critical infrastructures are such that their function is vital for society; the
vulnerability is the probability of system collapse. See Torbjorn Thedeen, Setting the Stage: 
The Vulnerability of Critical Infrastructures, in  PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE 
FROM ACTS OF TERRORISM 34 (K.V. Frolov & G.B. Baecher eds., 2006). 
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attacks35 for reasons beyond their indispensable role in global markets.
These reasons include: 
• Sensitive nodes. UEI is increasingly centralized to minimize
operating costs with multiple wells, often connected to a 
network of seabed pipelines, moving oil and gas to shore.36 
Meanwhile, telecommunication companies confront a paucity 
of adequate cable termination points that are isolated from 
heavy fishing and strong ocean currents.37 
• Concentrated routing and information chokepoints (cables 
only).  Consolidation and interdependence is even more acute 
beyond territorial waters.38 At present, a large channel capacity 
in existing fiber optic lines provides re-routing capability.
Now, telecommunication companies concentrate a large 
percentage of overall bandwidth in just a few major cable 
systems because new cable designs also incorporate such 
tremendous capacity.39  Constraints on cable laying also result 
35. See Michael Casey, Communications Infrastructure Security, in  PROTECTION
OF CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE, supra note 34, at 233 (location-based attacks include the 
intentional severing of the backbone at a pre-determined site).
36. See Karl Hasslinger, Vulnerabilities Await the U.S. on the Seabed, DEFENSE 
NEWS, Jan. 14, 2008 (on file with author).
37. Termination points are repeatedly “stacked” to save the considerable cost of
digging seabed trenches close to shore and then tunneling from the ocean bed up into a 
beach manhole.  For example, all but one cable that terminates along the southern coast
of the U.S. come ashore in three Florida cities.  Of ten trans-Atlantic cable systems 
terminating along the Northeast corridor, eight terminate at two New Jersey cities, and
two in Rhode Island. See LACROIX ET AL., supra note 24, at 144. 
38. Until 1989, consortia dominated by monopoly telephone companies constructed
international submarine cables, primarily to carry their own voice traffic. Telecommunication 
operators would sign a construction and maintenance agreement under which they agreed to
contract, commission, operate, maintain, and own a cable system.  These consortium cables
remain common for very large or complicated systems, such as SEA-ME-WE 4, linking 
Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Western Europe.  By contrast, Fiber Link Around
the Globe (FLAG) Telecom is a private cable system that uses an increasingly popular 
“sponsors approach,” in which one or more private sponsors undertake the construction 
of the cable.  Operators then purchase capacity, either through pre-sales or after final 
acceptance.  The typical contract between a cable owner and a telecommunications operators 
use to be indefeasible rights-of-use (long-term rights, e.g., fifteen years or more, to use a
specific amount of transmission capacity); increasingly, they are short-term, usually one-
year leases. See Malecki & Wei, supra note 17, at 366–67.
39. See Carafano & Kochems, supra note 17, at 8. 
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in several cables being bundled together, offering a potentially
lucrative, consolidated target for sabotage.40 
• Non-fungible facilities (pipelines only).  Pipelines that deliver 
oil and gas to markets ashore form tight linkages between at-
sea facilities and nation-states.  This would enable an aggressor 
to inflict disproportionate economic pain on nation-states that 
receive the piped fuel ashore, even though ripple effects 
might reverberate through the broader global energy market. 
• Dire environmental consequences (pipelines only).  Various 
oil and gas companies continuously monitor the internal 
condition of pipelines.  However keen their pipeline integrity 
management and best practices, leaks are still possible from 
damage due to external objects.41  Potential ecological and 
environmental disasters ensue from pipeline ruptures.42 
• Thin, expensive repair capacity. Pipelines are lucrative targets
because of high replacement costs and scarce and specialized
repair and salvage capabilities.43  Similarly for cables, low
40. Whereas, a single point attack on an undersea oil pipe might halt oil supply
from one field (which is only a fraction of world oil supply, which, in turn, is only a 
fraction of total energy supply), a cable cut results in instant outage for all users upstream and
downstream; no optical-electric equivalent of reserve production capacity exists when a 
bundle is entirely severed.  Island nations are particularly susceptible.  Rerouting capacity
overland to cable termini in Canada and South America could mitigate the effects of an
attack against U.S. subsea cables, but a single cut in 2000 to the SEA-WE-ME 3 network 
leading from Australia to Singapore caused Australia’s largest Internet provider—Telstra— to
lose up to 70% of its Internet capacity. See LACROIX, supra note 24, at 144.  Similarly,
Taiwan and Japan would be particularly vulnerable to undersea cable disruption, as 
evidenced by the severe communications disruption following an offshore earthquake in
Taiwan in December 2006. See Chris Williams, Taiwan Earthquake Shakes Internet,
REGISTER (U.K.) (Dec. 27, 2006), available at http://www.theregister.co.uk/2006/12/27 
boxing_day_earthquake_taiwan/ (last visited June 6, 2010). 
41. See Applied Tech. Workshop Abstract, Soc’y of Petroleum Eng’rs Int’l,
Emergency Pipeline Repair Execution—Best Practices 3 (Jan. 12–14, 2009), available at
http://www.spe.org/events/09adbi/documents/09ADBI_09AAD2.pdf. 
42. Witness BP’s struggle in the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig 
explosion on April 20, 2010.  And as the United States and other Polar nations jockey for
territorial rights in the increasingly accessible Arctic Ocean, an earlier oil spill on BP’s 
hands became the impetus for the Arctic Oil Spill Research and Recovery Act (S. Bill
1561), which calls for more research to improve spill prevention and response in the 
Arctic.  See Leonard Doyle, Oil Gushes Into Arctic Ocean From BP Pipeline, INDEP.
(U.K.) (Mar. 21, 2006), available at http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/oil-gushes-
into-arctic-ocean-from-bp-pipeline-470745.html. 
43. There are only a few dozen large pipe-laying ships worldwide capable of 
welding together large pipeline sections and feeding them gently to the seafloor.  The
consortium of oil lessees operating on the Norwegian continental shelf relies instead on a
small number of very advanced industrial robots (some weighing up to 100 tons), housed 
on a remote island near Stavanger, Norway.  And five weeks into the environmental 
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market prices and high operating and maintenance costs have 
caused service fleets, the availability of trained crews, and 
worldwide spare part inventories to dwindle.44 
• Targeting data readily available in the public domain. 
National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Agency (NOAA) 
nautical charts available on the Internet clearly depict platforms 
and connecting undersea pipelines.45  Cable routes and landing 
stations are well-marked too.46 
• Security responsibility gaps. Outside territorial waters,
competing multinational corporations are free to route subsea 
pipelines provided they observe due care.  However, unclear 
responsibilities beyond the boundaries of mining leaseholds 
generate little incentive for commercial companies to invest
in common security systems.  Moreover, cables span beyond 
the continental shelf, making them susceptible to surreptitious 
attack in the high seas. And as with undersea pipelines, 
governments have shifted much of the burden of cable 
defense to the private sector.47  In response, private industry 
has adopted cost-effective practices to deal with incidental 
disaster that followed the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig explosion of April 21, 2010, 
Coast Guard Admiral Thad Allen, national incident commander for the oil spill, admitted 
that “those (repair) technologies are not replicated inside the federal government.”  PBS 
Newshour (PBS television broadcast May 24, 2010), transcript available at http://www.
pbs.org/newshour/bb/environment/jan-june10/thadallen_05-24.html. 
44. See Carafano & Kochems, supra note 17, at 9. 
45. See generally NOAA, Chart 11356, available at http://www.charts.noaa.gov/ 
OnLineViewer/11356.shtml, and infra Attachment B (a close-up centered on 29º 07'N, 
91º 15'W, approximately nine miles south of Point Au Fer Island, La.)
46. See, e.g., Submarine Telecommunications Cable, GOV’T OF W. AUSTL. DEP’T 
OF TRANSP. (Dec. 6, 2007), http://www.dpi.wa.gov.au/imarine/19466.asp (SEA-ME-WE
3 submarine communications cable 51 nautical miles from Perth, Australia) (last visited 
June 6, 2010). See also Eyebaling Transatlantic Cable Landings Eastern US, CRYPTOME,
http://cryptome.org/eyeball/cable/cable-eyeball.htm (U.S. transatlantic cable landings); 
Eyeballing Transpacific Cable Landings Western US, CRYPTOME, http://cryptome.org/
eyeball/cablew/cablew-eyeball.htm (last visited June 6, 2010) (U.S. transpacifc cable 
landings).
47. In March 2002, at the 30th annual meeting of the National Ocean Industries 
Association, a panel of National Security agency representatives outlined some of the 
“precautionary steps companies should be taking to most efficiently protect themselves” 
(emphasis added). White House Office of Homeland Security representative Thomas 
DiNanno went on to say, “The assets are too diverse, and the challenges are too broad for
the federal government to handle all of this.” See Thomas J. Michels, NOIA Annual 
Meeting—Safety and Security for Offshore Energy, SEA TECH., Apr. 2002, at 47–49. 
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damage, but not necessarily to prevent purposeful damage.48 
The growing regionalization of cable systems further precludes
coastal states’ defenses.
III. THE THREAT: SUSCEPTIBILITY TO ATTACK FROM
UNDER THE SEA
A. Undersea Concealment 
Undersea systems—whether offensive, defensive, or commercial— 
share a fundamental set of attributes that derive from the nature of the 
domain in which they exist. 
First, the undersea is opaque.  What little sensory information is 
available is often distorted, incomplete, and ambiguous.  Undersea 
systems are hard to detect without specialized equipment, and even then
detection ranges are short and tracking information is murky.  In contrast 
to a world of clear three-dimensional vision, precise radar images, and
unconstrained line-of-sight communications at the speed of light, there 
are limits to data availability and transmission rates underwater. 
Second, the demanding physical environment under water dramatically 
constrains one’s range of motion.  Pressure, salt water, and the absence
of air and light make it technically challenging to operate undersea.  This 
challenge grows dramatically as depth and time below the surface 
increase.
As a result of this opacity and these technological hurdles, the
undersea domain remains an operational sanctuary for those who can 
afford to operate in it. In recent years, commercial submarines and
remotely operated vehicles have facilitated access to this hostile 
environment.  In turn, the impetus to drill in deeper and more isolated
areas or to lay billion-dollar cables has increased as this technological 
capacity grows.  These trends provide greater opportunities to use the 
sea for legitimate purposes, but they also enhance vulnerability to attack. 
Why attack undersea pipelines and cables from under the sea? The 
short answer is stealth, which provides sanctuary from detection and 
prosecution.49 
48. No organization monitors global networks for a concerted attack.  Cable companies
monitor their own cables and work with each other to repair outages quickly, but provide no 
feedback to governments. See Carafano & Kochems, supra note 17, at 9.
49. See Karl Hasslinger, Undersea Warfare: The Hidden Threat, ARMED FORCES J.
(Mar. 2008), available at http://www.afji.com/2008/03/3463927. 
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Unlike aviation stealth, which requires highly sophisticated and expensive aircraft, 
nearly any vehicle operating under the sea is extremely difficult to find.  Whereas
radars can scan thousands of square miles of air space and do so continuously, 
there is no equivalent system underwater.  No one is watching the undersea 
approaches or checking the seabed along the continental shelf for nefarious activity. 
There is no undersea analogy to the no-fly zone designed to protect critical 
airspace.50 
The stealth afforded by the sea—even for unsophisticated users— 
infers several advantages.51  First and foremost is the ability to operate in
proximity to an adversary’s property without being observed.52 
Surprise is a second major incentive because it enhances the ability to 
circumvent defensive measures.53  A major advantage submarines enjoy 
is the ability to strike adversaries quickly and with surprise from close-in 
positions. Rogue actors may seek similar methods of asymmetric attack,
for while attackers can easily locate targets of interest, the defender’s 
task of detecting, classifying, and blocking undersea adversaries remains
technologically and operationally challenging.  High-frequency sonar 
systems or lasers can only see at short ranges, making large-area
surveillance extremely difficult.54 
Underwater concealment also maximizes economy of force.55 “It 
allows a smaller number of operatives to place explosives in multiple 
locations over an extended time frame and later conduct coordinated, 
simultaneous strikes at a time of their choosing,” making it harder for 
intelligence agencies to uncover.56 
A final incentive is cost imposition due to ambiguity.57  Just as post-
9/11 air travel security measures instituted by the Transportation 
50. See id.
51. See id. 
52. Commercial security solutions for the Oil and Gas Industry include underwater 
surveillance to isolate and track underwater intruders.  See, e.g., Security Solutions for 
the Oil & Gas Industry, THALES GROUP, 4–5 available at http://www.thalesgroup.com/
Workarea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=2746&LangType=2057. 
53. See Hasslinger, supra note 49. 
54. Passive sonar is useful only to the extent undersea vehicles emit transient or 
continuous sound energy.  Although some large passive sonar systems such as the Sound 
Surveillance System were effective in detecting older Soviet submarines at long range, 

























   
  
   
  
 
   





    
  
    
Security Administration (TSA) have robbed millions of travelers of their 
time, increased the cost of air travel, and reduced overall productivity,
one successful undersea attack could instill enormous anxiety and 
impose greater security costs.58 
Ambiguity, coupled with our extreme reliance on undersea infrastructure,
was on display in late January and early February 2008.  Four undersea 
telecommunication cables were mysteriously cut within the course of 
two days, crippling Internet access across wide swaths of the Middle
East and India.59  Two cable breaks were in the Mediterranean—one
near Alexandria, Egypt, and the other in the waters off Marseille, 
France.60  The third break was thirty-five miles off the coast of Dubai 
and the fourth was along a cable linking the United Arab Emirates to
Qatar.61  Most telecommunication experts and operators deemed
sabotage unlikely, believing instead that ship anchors had severed the 
cables when heavy storms swept through the region.62  Nevertheless, the 
Egyptian Ministry of Communications refuted the presence of any ships 
near the Mediterranean cable cuts.63  Moreover, the improbable 
incidence of four cuts in 48 hours fueled speculation about military
involvement.64  Sabotage theorists seized on reports of stifled Internet 
traffic through Iran,65 while traffic to Israel, Lebanon and Iraq was 
apparently immune from chaos.66 At the very least, this episode
highlights how relatively small damage to undersea cables can instantly
affect millions of people, and how a stealthy underwater attack— 
ambiguous and non-attributive in nature—could deal such a crippling
blow.
58. See id.
59. See Heather Timmons, Ruptures Call Safety of Internet Cables Into Question, 
INT’L HERALD TRIB., 16 (Feb. 4, 2008), available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/02/
04/technology/cables.php. 
60. See id.
61. See id. See also Les Cottrell & Qasim Lone, Effects of Fibre Outage through 
Mediterranean Seen by PingER, SLAC (Jan. 30, 2008), http://www.slac.stanford.edu/
grp/scs/net/talk08/med_fibre_cut_jan08.ppt. 
62. See Timmons, supra note 59. 
63. See id.
64. See, e.g., Richard Sauder, Middle East Undersea Cable Cutting A Zionist-
NeoCon Covert Operation?, RENSE.COM (Feb. 2, 2008), http://www.rense.com/general80/
mid.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2010).
65. See id. (citing http://www.internettrafficreport.com/asia.htm).  Is it farfetched 
to believe state or non-state actors might tamper with submarine cables or pipelines to
achieve desired effects? See  SHERRY SONTAG & CHRISTOPHER DREW, BLIND MAN’S 
BLUFF: THE UNTOLD STORY OF AMERICAN SUBMARINE ESPIONAGE 237–57 (1998) (accounting 
U.S. submarine cable tapping operations during the Cold War). 
66. Internet Failure Hits Two Continents, CNN.COM (Jan. 31, 2008), available at
http://www.mindfully.org/Technology/2008/Internet-Cable-Failure31jan08.htm. 
236
WRATHALL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/9/2010 3:20 PM     
 

















    
 
     
     
    
 




[VOL. 12:  223, 2010] The Vulnerability of Subsea Infrastructure 
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
B. Unmanned Undersea Vehicles 
Traditionally, there has been a high entry barrier to deep ocean areas.
Only navies or state-sponsored research organizations could fund the 
vehicles needed to descend and work in such a hostile environment. 
However, today, an enemy could use a cheaply modified commercial or
scientific vehicle combined with off-the-shelf sensors and explosives to 
attack undersea pipelines and cables.67 
The most likely threat comes from Unmanned Undersea Vehicles 
(UUVs).68  A UUV is defined as a “[s]elf-propelled submersible whose 
operation is either fully autonomous (pre-programmed or real-time 
adaptive mission control) or under minimal supervisory control and is 
untethered except, possibly, for data links such as a fiber optic cable.”69 
The progress of resource extraction into deeper water has spurred the 
commercialization of UUVs in recent decades.70 
Tethered variants were first used to recover underwater ordnance in 
the 1960s.71  Today, researchers, salvagers, and undersea operators on 
ocean platforms or surface vessels continue to rely on their deep diving 
capability and their high degree of dexterity.72  Virtual and augmented 
reality displays now fuse sensor inputs and further immerse shipboard
operators in the vehicle’s environment.73 
67. See Carafano & Kochems, supra note 17, at 9 (citing CENTER FOR STRATEGIC
AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS, MARITIME FUTURES: THE UNDERSEA ENVIRONMENT 50 
(Jan. 2003)).
68. UUV mirrors terminology utilized by the U.S. Navy.  Elsewhere these vehicles 
have additional monikers, including Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUVs), Autonomous
Marine Vehicles (AMVs), and Remotely Operated Vehicles (ROVs).  See Andrew H. 
Henderson, Murky Waters: The Legal Status of Unmanned Undersea Vehicles, 53 NAVAL L.
REV. 55, 56 (2006). 
69. See U.S. DEP’T. OF NAVY, THE NAVY UNMANNED UNDERSEA VEHICLE (UUV)
MASTER PLAN 4 (Nov. 9, 2004), available at http://auvac.org/research/publications/files/
2004/uuvmasterplan.pdf. 
70. See Bob Nugent, The State of the Market: UUVs, AMI INT’L., http://www.
nwdefense.com/ami.pdf (last visited June 6, 2010). 
71. See DELBERT C. SUMMEY ET AL., NAVAL SURFACE WARFARE CENTER, COASTAL
SYSTEMS STATION, DAHLGREN DIVISION, CSS/TR-01/09, SHAPING THE FUTURE OF NAVAL
WARFARE WITH UNMANNED SYSTEMS 3–7 (July 2001), available at http://handle.dtic. 
mil/100.2/ADA397057.
72. See id.  See also How Remotely Operated Vehicles Work in the Subsea, BP.COM
(May 4, 2010), http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=9033657&contentId=706
1733 (last visited June 6, 2010). 
73. See A. Op den Bosch & J.C. Santamaria, Monitoring Underwater Jobs Using
Virtual Environments, SEA TECH., Apr. 2002, at 17–25. 
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Untethered UUVs are also proliferating.74  Those modified from
commercial or scientific designs could provide an adversary what 
amount to guided torpedoes.75  Though of limited range, UUVs can 
detonate at some prearranged time long after the delivery platform, 
submarine or surface vessel, has left. 
Defending against such UUVs would require the operation of 
undersea point defense systems that can detect intruding vehicles and
respond in a timely fashion.76  Such measures would provide situational
awareness of any limited entryways into areas of concern, and would 
also require significant investment.  These efforts would probably
impose a cost burden on states or alliances—not commercial entities. 
And such national-level investment would be unlikely to materialize 
unless undersea telecommunications, or the energy resources extracted
from the defended fields, were solely bound for the states providing the 
defensive systems.
Alternatively, defenders could make efforts to create exclusion areas
that prevent mother ship penetration in the first place.  This limitation, or 
denial of passage, capitalizes on the existing weakness of both tethered 
and untethered variants of UUVs: both are tied to their delivery platform. 
The motive force for tethered vehicles is derived from the continuous
electrical feed through their umbilical. Meanwhile, untethered variants 
are constrained by limited battery life.  Their range, speed, and sensor 
capability is a function of their battery reserves.  Thus, constricting the 
movement of potential delivery platforms is the surest defense against 
remote or autonomous UUVs they may harbor.
“A strong case can be made under U.S. law that UUVs are in fact
vessels and, therefore, subject to all applicable rules for operation and 
navigation.”77  This is because most UUVs will either be considered 
components of their support ships, or be construed as vessels outright.78 
74. See Nugent, supra note 70. 
75. See Ronald O’Rourke, Unmanned Vehicles for U.S. Naval Forces: Background
and Issues for Congress, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. (Oct. 25, 2006), available at http://fas. 
org/sgp/crs/weapons/RS21294.pdf, for a list of current U.S. Navy UUV missions and
programs.  See also Mathew Ritchey, Unmanned Undersea Vehicles: An Asymmetric Tool for
Sea Denial, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE (May 21, 2008), available at http://handle.dtic.mil/
100.2/ADA484490 (student paper).
76. See, e.g., UUV MASTER PLAN, supra note 69, at 35–40. 
77. Henderson, supra note 68, at 72. 
78. “If construed a submarine, like the largest UUVs might, they would be treated 
as such and be deemed vessels. If not, then under “component” criteria, UUVs would gain 
“vicarious” vessel status from the launching and/or controlling vessel, as the UUV would
be both engaged in a maritime service and have some relation to navigation—or at least 
some connection with a vessel. Finally, [. . .] the fact that ‘free-swimming’ UUVs were
238
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Far less regulatory or statutory guidance is available in the
international arena.79  If deemed vessels, UUVs may enjoy sovereign 
immunity as either warships or auxiliaries.80  So, given the growing
availability of UUVs to state and non-state actors around the world, the
establishment of clear rules for their operation is crucial to nations with
interests beyond territorial seas.81 
IV. THE LEGAL STATUS OF SUBMARINE PIPELINES AND CABLES
States and private owners may assert claims or jurisdiction over 
undersea infrastructure on various grounds.  States may assert claims on 
behalf of injured parties incorporated or present within their jurisdiction. 
Pipeline and cable owners, meanwhile, have direct recourse to traditional 
admiralty remedies in national courts that retain jurisdiction over the 
vessels and persons responsible for undersea depredations.82  However, 
under international law, a corporate person whose property has been
damaged possesses rights that are merely derivative of the rights of its 
state of nationality.83  As a broad based source of international maritime 
rights and obligations, the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(LOSC, or colloquially, the “Constitution of the Oceans”)84 currently 
constructed for a purpose other than the transportation of persons or things does not 
preclude outright vessel status.  As such, even the most autonomous UUVs could be deemed
vessels in their own right.” Henderson, supra note 68, at 66–67.  However, it is conceivable 
that a UUV launched and operated from shore would have no support ship, nor would it 
technically be a means of transportation.
79. Henderson, supra note 68, at 72. 
80. A well-established tenet of international law is that warships are extensions of 
their respective states, enjoying “sovereign immunity from interference by the authorities 
of nations other than the flag nation.” U.S. DEP’T. OF NAVY, NWP 1-14M, THE 
COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS—ANNOT. SUPP. ¶ 2.1.2 
(1997). Meanwhile, “[a]uxiliaries are vessels, other than warships, that are owned by or 
under the exclusive control of the armed forces.  Because they are state owned or operated 
and used for the time being only on government noncommercial service, auxiliaries enjoy 
sovereign immunity.”  Id. ¶ 2.1.3. 
81. See Henderson, supra note 68, at 72. 
82. See Mark P. Green & Douglas R. Burnett, Security of International Submarine 
Cable Infrastructure - Time to Rethink?, in LEGAL CHALLENGES IN MARITIME SECURITY
557, 563 (Myron H. Nordquist et al. eds., 2008). 
83. See generally Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd., (Belg. v. Spain),
Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. 3. (Feb. 5, 1970), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/
50/5387.pdf.
84. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter LOSC].
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contains the most robust provisions for claims asserted by either affected
states or subsea proprietors. 
The legal status of pipelines in waters beyond national jurisdiction has 
been associated with the status of submarine cables.85  Without the 
LOSC, two operative treaties for international cables exist: the 1884 
International Convention for Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables 
(Cable Convention),86 and the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High
Seas.87  These treaties deal with laying and repairing cables on the high 
seas—not in Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) and upon the continental 
shelf.88  Moreover, they do not afford commercial owners significant 
deterrence against depredations.
Article 2 of the 1884 Cable Convention provides that “the breaking or 
injury of a submarine cable, done willfully or through culpable negligence, 
and resulting in total or partial interruption or embarrassment of telegraphic
communication, shall be a punishable offence, but the punishment
inflicted shall be no bar to a civil action for damages.”  Additionally,
Article 10 allows a warship to obtain evidence of malfeasance.89 
However, unlike the LOSC, discussed below, no piracy provisions 
85. See C. JOHN COLOMBOS, THE INT’L LAW OF THE SEA 382 (6th ed. 1967). 
86. See Convention for the Protection of Sub-marine Cables, Mar. 14, 1884, 18 
U.S.T. 380 [hereinafter Cable Convention]. 
87. See Geneva Convention on the High Seas, arts. 26, 27, Apr. 29, 1958, 450
U.N.T.S. 82. 
88. The EEZ is defined as the area adjacent to and beyond territorial seas out to 200
nautical miles from the baselines from which territorial seas are measured.  See LOSC, 
supra note 84, arts. 55, 57.  The continental shelf comprises the seabed and subsoil of the
submarine areas beyond the territorial sea to the outer edge of the continental margin, or 
to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baseline, whichever is greater.  See id. art.
76. The High Seas are all parts of the sea beyond the EEZ. See id. art. 86.  See generally
Douglas R. Burnett, Maritime—Legal Jurisdiction Over International Submarine Cables, 
available at www.iscpc.org/information/Legal_Regimes.PDF (two-slide presentation of 
Squire, Sanders & Dempsey L.L.P.), and infra Attachment C (amended first slide). 
89.  Evidence of violations of this convention may be obtained by all methods  
of securing proof that are allowed by the laws of the country of the court before
which a case has been brought.  When [commanding officers]… shall have reason
to believe that an infraction of the measures provided by this Convention has
been committed by a vessel other than a vessel of war, they may require the 
captain or master to exhibit the official documents furnishing evidence of the 
nationality of the said vessel…. Reports may, moreover, be prepared by the
said officers, whatever may be the nationality of the inculpated vessel.
Cable Convention, supra note 86, art.10.  This right was exercised in The Novorossiisk, 
when a warship boarded a Soviet fishing trawler on the high sea suspected of cutting 
transatlantic cables.  See Press Release 211, U.S. and U.S.S.R. Exchange Notes on 
Damage to Submarine Cables, 40 DEP’T OF STATE BULL. 543, 555 (Apr. 20, 1959).  The 
U.S. Government was satisfied that the evidence obtained raised a strong presumption
that the master and crew of the trawler had violated Article 2 of the Cable Convention.
See id.
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provide for seizure of the offending vessel or universal jurisdiction over
its crew. Also, the Cable Convention does not restrict breaking a 
belligerent state’s cable during wartime.90  In fact, during World War I, 
both Britain and Germany undertook offensive actions against each
other’s submarine cables.91 
In its deliberations on the law of the sea, the International Law
Commission (ILC) also considered the emerging issue of pipelines in the 
same context as submarine cables.92  It confirmed that a state had the
right to operate pipelines or cables beyond the territorial sea—through 
the high seas and on the continental shelf—provided such activity did 
not interfere with the coastal state’s right to exploit its natural resources.93 
The ensuing 1958 Convention on the High Seas adopted the 1887 Cable 
Convention protection provisions, but simply confirmed the right to lay 
cables and pipelines outside the territorial sea.94 
The LOSC, in contrast, provides a more robust legal regime for 
submarine cables and pipelines in ten specific articles.95  One of the 
“freedoms of the high seas” is the right to lay and operate cables on the
seabed.96  This freedom now extends to territorial seas,97 archipelagic
waters,98 the EEZ,99 the continental shelf,100 and “on the bed of the high
seas beyond the continental shelf”101—which falls partly under national
90. See Cable Convention, supra note 86, art. 15. 
91. See ROBERT K. MASSIE, CASTLES OF STEEL 77 (2003).
92. See Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, Commentary to the Articles Concerning 
the Law of the Sea, 8th Sess, Apr. 23–July 4, 1956, arts. 61–5, U.N. Doc. A/3159; 
GAOR 11th Sess, Supp. No. 9 (1956), reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 293– 
94, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add.1. 
93. See id., art. 70, at 298–99. 
94. See Convention on the High Seas, supra note 87, arts. 26–28. 
95. See LOSC, supra note 84, arts. 21, 51, 58, 79, 87, 112–15, and 297(1)(a). 
96. Id. art. 87(1)(c).  This freedom is subject to Part IV, pertaining to archipelagic 
states. See id.  Although Article 87 phrases this freedom in the active tense (i.e., the freedom
to lay rather than maintain cable systems), when read in the context of other LOSC articles
concerning cables, it is obvious that the freedom to lay encompasses cable operation and
repair.  See id. arts. 58(1) and 79(5). 
97. Id. art. 21(1).
98. Id. art. 51(2).
99. Id. art. 58(1).
100. Id. art. 79. 
101. Id. art. 112. 
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jurisdiction if still in the EEZ,102 but mostly under the responsibility of
the International Sea-Bed Authority (in what is known as the Area).103 
Though the LOSC does not consider the protection of submarine 
cables and pipelines in the EEZ, it does so in the context of the high 
seas.104  With text that clearly draws from the 1884 Cable Convention,
states have the obligation to pass laws and regulations to make the
willful or culpably negligent breaking of a submarine cable or pipeline 
an offense.105  Such offense can apply to ships flying the state’s flag or 
to the state’s nationals.106 
The omission of submarine cable and pipeline protection in the EEZ 
can be explained by the nature of the right to lay a cable or pipeline. 
Apart from the restriction to have due regard for the coastal State’s rights and 
advise it of a proposed route for a cable,107 the right to lay a cable or pipeline 
through the EEZ is treated essentially as a high seas right. . . . This conclusion
draws support from provisions concerning dispute resolution under the [LOSC], 
particularly [A]rticle 297, which indicates that while other EEZ rights need not 
be subject to compulsory dispute resolution, those attaching to high seas
freedoms, [such as the laying of pipelines and cables, must be.]108 
This freedom to lay cables may, therefore, serve as a two-fold basis
for bringing a claim for damages.  First, according to ILC draft articles,
state responsibility is triggered by an internationally wrongful act.109  An
internationally wrongful act is conduct consisting of an “action or
102. Id. art. 79(2).
103. See Burnett, supra note 88, and infra Attachment C (visual map of legal
jurisdiction and regimes).
104. See LOSC, supra note 84, art. 113. 
105. Every State shall adopt the laws and regulations necessary to provide that
the breaking or injury by a ship flying its flag or by a person subject to its 
jurisdiction of a submarine cable beneath the high seas done wilfully or through
culpable negligence, in such a manner as to be liable to interrupt or obstruct 
telegraphic or telephonic communications, and similarly the breaking or injury
of a submarine pipeline or high-voltage power cable, shall be a punishable offence.
This provision shall apply also to conduct calculated or likely to result in such 
breaking or injury.  However, it shall not apply to any break or injury caused
by persons who acted merely with the legitimate object of saving their lives or
their ships, after having taken all necessary precautions to avoid such break or
injuries.
Id. art. 113. 
106. Id.
107. Id. art. 79(5).
108. Stuart Kaye, International Measures to Protect Oil Platforms, Pipelines,
and Submarine Cables from Attack, 31 TUL. MAR. L.J. 377, 402–03 (2007). 
109. Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 1, [2001] 2 Y.B.
INT’L L. COMM’N 32, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1, available at http://untreaty. 
un.org/ilc/publications/yearbooks/Ybkvolumes(e)/ILC_2001_v2_p2_e.pdf. 
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omission” in breach of an international obligation of that state.110  Conduct 
is attributable to the state if an individual or group of individuals act “on 
the instructions of” or “under the direction or control of” that state.111 
Second, since the LOSC calls for the application of flag state laws and 
regulations for the protection of cables and pipelines in the high seas,112 a 
state could also be held liable for shirking “jurisdictional control” over
ships flying its flag in respect of “administrative, technical and social
matters.”113 
Moreover, while LOSC provides that the high seas shall be reserved
for peaceful purposes,114 it is not intended to be the sole source of law in
relation to the high seas or EEZ.115  The LOSC is lex generalis, which 
must be viewed in the context of lex specialis dealing with the use of 
force at international law.116  The legitimate use of force under the U.N.
Charter, either in self-defense or pursuant to a Security Council resolution, 
should be permissible in all maritime areas.  Such an interpretation is 
explicitly supported in Article 301 of the LOSC.117 
V. SHORTCOMINGS IN THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF SUBMARINE 
PIPELINES AND CABLES
The LOSC provisions are for essential security protection within 
territorial seas.118  Any threat or use of force or weapons, any act prejudicial
110. Id. draft art. 2.
111. Id. draft art. 8.
112. See LOSC, supra note 84, art. 94(7). 
113. Id. art. 94(1).
114. Id. art. 88. 
115. Id. art. 87(1).
116. Stuart Kaye, Freedom of Navigation in a Post 9/11 World: Security and Creeping
Jurisdiction, in THE LAW OF THE SEA: PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS 353 (David Freestone et
al. eds., 2006). 
117. In exercising their rights and performing their duties under this Convention,
state parties shall refrain from any threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United 
Nations. 
LOSC, supra note 84, art. 301. 
118. The coastal State, may, without discrimination in form or in fact among 
foreign ships, suspend temporarily in specified areas of its territorial sea the
innocent passage of foreign ships if such suspension is essential for the protection
of its security, including weapons exercises.  Such suspension shall take effect
only after being duly published. 
Id. art. 25(3). 
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to good order or security, or any launching of a military craft, is considered
inconsistent with the right of innocent passage in the territorial seas.119 
Meanwhile, the freedoms of the high seas are described as being
subject to the conditions set in the LOSC and “other rules of
international law.”120  However, in light of the vulnerability of undersea
cables and pipelines to underwater subterfuge, the breadth of international
law that provides protection beyond territorial seas is limited, even under 
the LOSC. 
A. Lack of Domestic Legislation to Enforce               
Article 113 of the LOSC 
The degree of protection under the LOSC would improve if parties 
were to adopt domestic legislation with teeth.121  In spite of directing  
states to enact domestic legislation making malfeasance a punishable 
offense,122 regulatory deficiencies persist.  U.S. submarine cable law is
exemplary in the way it frustrates cable owners’ protection and recovery
efforts. In typical cases of damage by vessels, cable repair and restoration 
of telecommunication services can cost cable owners up to $2 million in 
expenses and lost revenue.123  Nevertheless, the U.S. federal statute for
submarine cable protection imposes a paltry maximum penalty of only
$5,000 for willful injury to cables.124  This inconsequential fine
underscores the feeble enforcing mechanism LOSC signatories utilize to
ensure other states domesticate any legislative deterrent. 
The following account of one LOSC signatory is illustrative of this 
anemic enforcement.  In May 2007, it was reported that the Vietnamese
military had recovered a significant amount of undersea cable and
related equipment on Vietnamese soil, which was later confirmed as 
belonging to commercial carriers.125  It was also reported that numerous
vessels had been outfitted with special equipment to cut these cables and 
that cable coordinates were being sold illicitly.126  Then, in June, it was
reported that over 500 kilometers of telecom cable, including an eleven
kilometer segment of the SEA-ME-WE 3 cable system, were seized by
119. See id. arts. 19(1), (2)(a)–2(c), 2(f). 
120. See id. art. 87(1).
121. See Eric Wagner, Submarine Cables and Protections Provided by the Law of the 
Sea, 19 MARINE POL’Y 127 (1995). 
122. See LOSC, supra note 84, art. 113. 
123. See Coffen-Smout & Herbert, supra note 1, at 444. 
124. 47 U.S.C. § 21 (2006). 
125. See Green & Burnett, supra note 82, at 561. 
126. See id.
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Vietnamese police.127  It subsequently came to light that local authorities
had been complicit in the removal and theft of some undersea cables.
The local authorities  permitted fisherman  to salvage, remove, and sell
lengths of copper cable pinpointed as having been deployed before 1975,
but did not anticipate that the fishermen would take this authorization as 
carte blanche to abscond with all types of cables.128  In this instance, not 
only was there a paltry penalty for cable depredations, but as the reporting 
suggests, the cable thefts could also be traced to the flag government of 
the culprit vessels.129 
B. Lack of Physical Manifestation Means Less Protection 
The physical manifestation of offshore installations such as oil and gas 
platforms affords them a legal status—and concomitant protection— 
unavailable to underwater infrastructure.  For cables and pipelines, there 
is no equivalent to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Protocol)130 or its 2005 
Amendment.131 
Specific concerns about maritime terrorism against offshore oil and 
gas installations led to the SUA Protocol in 1988.  This protocol applies 
to “fixed platforms” on the continental shelf, but not the territorial sea,
which include artificial islands, installations, and structures engaged in
exploration or exploitation of the seabed or some other economic 
seabed.132  Offenses under the SUA Protocol are very similar to those
under the SUA Convention.133  These include seizure by force, threat, or 
127. See id. 
128. See id. at 561–63. 
129. See id. at 561. 
130. See Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed 
Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 304 [hereinafter
SUA Protocol].
131. See International Maritime Organization [IMO], Protocol of 2005 to the Protocol 
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on
the Continental Shelf, IMO Doc. LEG/CONF. 15/22 (Nov. 1, 2005) [hereinafter 2005
SUA Protocol Amendments].
132. SUA Protocol, supra note 130, art. 1.
133. See Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 201 [hereinafter SUA Convention]. 
The SUA Convention was negotiated as a direct result of the ACHILLE LAURO hijacking in
1985.  See Kaye, supra note 108, at 389. The lack of international consensus on whether the
Palestine Liberation Front’s seizure of this Italian cruise liner satisfied the “private” ends 
requirement for piracy drew attention to the need for international agreement. Id. The
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intimidation; destruction or damage threatening the safety of the platform; 
or placement of a device designed to damage, destroy, or endanger 
platform safety.134  Similarly, jurisdictional reach is as wide as under the 
SUA Convention. A coastal state exercises jurisdiction over fixed
platforms on its continental shelf as well as over foreign nationals or
stateless individuals who coerce the state.135 
While states were slow to adopt the SUA Convention and Protocol, 
9/11 renewed attention to international security risks and precipitated 
amendments to both.  The principal focus of the 2005 SUA Convention
Amendments136 is on the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD), and the use of a ship for terrorist activities or for transporting a 
violator of the SUA Convention is designated as an offense.137 
Meanwhile, the 2005 SUA Protocol Amendments for fixed platforms 
are less wide-ranging, but follow a similar trend.  New offenses are
created where an individual uses explosive, biological, or radioactive
material to cause damage to an installation, death, or serious injury.138 
The threat to undertake such an offense is an offense itself,139 as is
participation in the preparation and organization of such offenses.140 
Moreover, much of the SUA Convention and 2005 amendments relating 
to extradition, cooperation in acquiring data and evidence, and creation 
of domestic offenses are applied by the 2005 SUA Protocol mutatis 
mutandis in the context of the new offenses.141 
In light of these fixed platform protections in the SUA Protocol and 
the ensuing 2005 Amendments, it has been proposed that a pipeline 
associated with an installation on the continental shelf might be regarded 
as a structure142 and afforded equal protection.  However, a pipeline
SUA Convention provided for protection against certain acts against shipping, including
seizing a ship, performing acts of violence against individuals on a ship, damaging a ship
or its cargo in a way that endangers its safe navigation, endangering the safety of a ship by
interfering with maritime navigational facilities, or sending a false signal. Id. at 389–90. 
134. Id. art. 2.
135. Id. art. 3.
 136. IMO, Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, IMO Doc. LEG/CONF. 15/21 (Nov. 1, 2005)
[hereinafter 2005 SUA Convention Amendments].
137. See id. arts. 3bis(1)(a)(3), 3ter. 
138. See 2005 SUA Protocol Amendments, supra note 131, art. 2bis(a). 
139. See id. art. 2bis(c). 
140. See id. art. 2ter.
141. See id. art. 2. 
142. See IMO, Invitation To Consider the Legal Questions Associated with CO2
Sequestration in Geological Formations Under the London Convention and Protocol, I.M.O.
Doc. LC.2/Circ.439 (Mar. 31, 2005), reprinted in http://www.imo.org/includes/blastData 
Only.asp/data_id%3D12076/439.pdf. 
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cannot be regarded as a structure for the purposes of the LOSC.143 
Given the LOSC’s explicit language when dealing with submarine 
cables and pipelines, it seems unlikely that a generic term would be used
to encompass pipelines in this context.144  And while the ILC in 1956 
considered the issue of safety zones around pipelines,145 such buffers
would effectively sever large ocean areas from international navigation. 
This was not the intent of the LOSC delegates who espoused freedom of
navigation, and it is even inconsistent with earlier work of the ILC.146 
In fact, in the context of safety zones, the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) has mandated that states mark pipeline locations on 
publicly available charts147 and disseminate details of pipeline work to 
ensure navigation safety.148 But such markings further publicize sensitive
location information—perhaps the sole protection in the absence of
safety zones afforded to fixed platforms offshore.
C. No Protection Under Article 101 (Piracy) of the LOSC 
Since the present system of enforcement based on nationality is
unsatisfactory to cope with undersea malfeasance, another potential 
mechanism to assert jurisdiction over terrorists launching or fleeing 
an attack might be to equate such acts to piracy, which attracts             
universal jurisdiction under the LOSC.149 This would avoid jurisdictional
entanglements and give any state—not merely coastal states—lawful
recourse.
However, there are several difficulties with such a formulation: first, 
the LOSC definition of piracy, that a piratical act should be for private 
gain, not political purpose;150 and second, the status of an installation in
143. See LOSC, supra note 84, art. 60 (dealing strictly with artificial islands,
installations and structures).
144. See Kaye, supra note 108, at 403. 
145. See Special Rapporteur, Regime of the High Seas and Regime of the Territorial
Sea, Int’l Law Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/97 (Jan. 27, 1956) (by J.P.A. François), 
reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 12, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add.1. 
146. See Kaye, supra note 108, at 403. 
147. See IMO, Safety Zones and Safety of Navigation around Offshore Installations 
and Structures, IMO Assemb. Res. A. 671(16) (Oct. 19, 1989) (replacing IMO Assemb.
Res. A. 621(15), IMO Assemb. Res. A. 379(X) and IMO Assemb. Res. A. 341(IX)). 
148. See id. annex ¶ 4.24. 
149. See LOSC, supra note 84, art. 110. 
150. See LOSC, supra note 84, art. 101. 
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international law.151 Traditional approaches to define piracy have
focused exclusively on ships,152 and while there have been debates as to
whether an installation could, under certain circumstances, be treated as
a ship,153 it is apparent in the context of the LOSC that installations are
treated distinctly from vessels.154 
In this regard, both fixed platforms and undersea infrastructure face an
uphill battle in gaining “vessel” status under the LOSC.  Like international
shipping, submarine cables span thousands of miles and are susceptible 
to attack from hostes humani generis,155 but the visible presence of fixed 
platforms affords them a stronger textual argument for being subject to
piratical acts.  And yet even these fixed platforms and their attendant 
piping fall short of vessel status since they are deemed within reach of 
coastal state defenses.156  In sum, application of the LOSC’s protection is
limited where terrorists take hostile actions for political, non-pecuniary
ends against fixed platforms and, especially, cables and pipelines that are
out of sight.
In total, there are substantial limitations on the legal regimes for the 
protection of submarine pipelines and cables beyond territorial seas. 
While some progress has been made in the context of installations with
the SUA Protocol and subsequent amendments, it is apparent that neither 
the LOSC nor any other international instrument were drafted with the 
possibility of an attack on pipelines or cables in mind, let alone an
underwater attack. The jurisdictional limitations on the United States 
and other coastal states to protect this critical infrastructure need to be 
addressed.
VI. PROPOSALS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Ratify the LOSC (United States specific) 
Even if the LOSC fails to classify subsea attack as piracy with full 
recourse to the convention’s robust remedies, it does proscribe 
depredations against cables and pipelines under the high seas and the 
151. See Kaye, supra note 108, at 415. 
152. See Colombos, supra note 85, at 443–57 (discussing historical development of
the law pertaining to piracy).
153. See Green & Burnett, supra note 82, at 578 (advocating how defining cable 
depredations as piracy within the meaning of art. 101 will facilitate a meaningful political and
legal response). 
154. Kaye, supra note 108, at 415. 
155. See Le Louis, (1817) 2 DODS. 210 (P.C.) 229, 165 Eng. Rep. 1464, 1467 
(U.K.).
156. See Kaye, supra note 108, at 416. 
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EEZ. As discussed above, the traditional rights of U.S. cable owners 
outside of territorial waters have been victimized by a dearth of
enforcing legislation. By delaying the ratification of the LOSC, this lack
of effective prosecution persists.157 
World telecom companies rightly believe that the LOSC facilitates 
more confident investments than simply operating under the bare aegis 
of customary international law.158  Simply defending against customary 
law encroachments does not deter underwater attack, but with U.S. 
ratification, U.S. telecom and energy companies as well as the U.S.
Navy could seek greater government assistance in enforcing property
rights and undersea infrastructure security outside of territorial seas.159 
Moreover, all U.S. stakeholders would have a firmer basis in holding
other states responsible for their loss.160 
As a condition for ratifying LOSC, the United States could take the 
helm in updating the convention to meet new military and commercial 
paradigms since it was first drafted three decades ago.  Such revisions 
may include one or more of the following proposals.
B. Adapt the 2005 SUA Protocol and Amendments 
The LOSC provides a starting point: the high seas shall be reserved 
for peaceful purposes.161  However, it is not intended to be the sole 
source of law in relation to the high seas or EEZ.162  In order to more
157. Douglas R. Burnett, The Importance of UNCLOS to the U.S. Cable Industry, 
TELECOMM. NEWSL. (Holland & Knight, U.S.), 1Q 2006, available at http://www.hklaw.
com/id24660/PublicationId2291/ReturnId31/contentid49626/. 
158. Statement of Douglas R. Burnett, supra note 12. 
159. An expert legal panel, convened in 2006 to assess trends in global legal order 
and their impact on maritime strategy, warned that the instability of the 1982 UNCLOS 
regime is exacerbated by the failure of the United States to accede to the convention. See
Craig H. Allen, Moderator’s Report: Legal Experts’ Workshop on the Future Global
Legal Order, 60 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REV. 73, 90 (2007). 
160. Each State shall cause an inquiry to be held by or before a suitably qualified person
or persons into every marine casualty or incident of navigation on the high seas
involving a ship flying its flag and casing loss of life or serious injury to nationals 
of another State or serious damage to ships or installations of another State or to the 
marine environment.  The flag State and the other State shall cooperate in the conduct 
of any inquiry held by that other State into any such marine casualty or incident of 
navigation. 
LOSC, supra note 84, art. 94(7). 
161. See id. art. 88.
162. See id. art. 87(1).
 249
























   
clearly delineate areas of responsibility and permissible jurisdiction over 
critical undersea infrastructure, the IMO could adapt the SUA Protocol
and Amendments to this end. Such lex specialis would give states a 
stronger basis for marshaling naval forces to surveil and patrol threatened
cables and pipelines, and if necessary, to board mother ships suspected
of launching surreptitious attacks.
The spine of this new Undersea Infrastructure Protocol could be a
mandatory system of cable and pipeline registration, which would give 
the state of registration a limited ability to enforce laws that protect it
from interference.163  The state would therefore have a right to protect 
pipelines or cables analogous to its right to protect vessels flying its flag. 
The drag on this new Protocol (or amended SUA Protocol) remains
the opacity of the seas and the impunity with which underwater craft, 
once launched, can inflict damage.  The fact that the threat lurks below 
the waterline, masked by stealth, and largely immune from detection and 
classification, renders most any response untimely, stifling the efficacy
of any lex specialis. 
C. Issue Declaratory Policies (United States specific) 
In light of the sensitivity of global economies to subsea infrastructure 
attack, the shortcomings in legal protection under the LOSC (even 
assuming U.S. Senate ratification), and the improbable effect of any 
SUA Protocol adaptation or amendment, the United States may look to 
the sheer deterrence of a powerful declaration.  This may take the shape
of a presidential proclamation that declares the sovereignty of all 
undersea infrastructure which is U.S. owned or services U.S. consumers,
and provides for retaliatory response if it is besieged.  Such declaration 
would comport with a rich tradition of U.S. presidential proclamations 
concerning jurisdictional boundaries at sea, which include: President 
Truman’s proclamation on the Continental Shelf;164 President Reagan’s
proclamation on sovereign rights and jurisdiction within the EEZ,165 and 
extension of the territorial sea to twelve nautical miles;166 and President
163. See Kaye, supra note 108, at 423. 
164. See Policy of the United States With Respect to the Natural Resources of the 
Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf, Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303 
(Sep. 28, 1945). 
165. See Exclusive Economic Zone of the United States of America, Proclamation
No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,605 (Mar. 14, 1983). 
166. See Territorial Sea of the United States of America, Proclamation No. 5928, 54 
Fed. Reg. 777 (Jan. 9, 1989). 
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Clinton’s proclamation extending the Contiguous Zone to twenty-four
nautical miles.167 
A proclamation of undersea infrastructure sovereignty would anchor
to the doctrine of self-defense—proportionate use of force against actors 
who threaten the security of undersea pipelines or cables.  Since freedom 
of navigation on the high seas and the EEZ is circumscribed by the 
notion of “due regard” for the rights of others,168 a surreptitious attack 
would first be classified as a violation of long-held customary international 
law, and, therefore, a legitimate basis for sanction. 
However, constraints similar to those limiting the efficacy of Protocol 
amendments arise.  Coastal and non-coastal states must characterize 
suspicious behavior as an affront to which they may respond.  Proof of
deliberate attack could be difficult to muster, tainting the legitimacy of 
any retaliatory act in the name of self-defense.
A second basis for presidential proclamation might be the doctrine of 
necessity, either environmental or commercial, in the face of imminent 
peril. The environmental necessity argument could be predicated on the 
ecological disaster that would ensue from an oil pipeline rupture. 
However, jurisdiction based on environmental protection would not
apply to telecommunication cables.  Moreover, the peril necessitating
preemptive action would be difficult to prove in advance of any disaster.
And though the LOSC permits coastal states to take enforcement actions 
against foreign ships in its territorial sea,169 any unilateral enforcement in
the EEZ or on the high seas would be decried as creeping jurisdiction. 
Commercial necessity would incorporate telecommunication cables
since their integrity is critical to global commerce.  But again, the evidentiary 
requirement for either preemptive action or retaliatory response could
prove disruptive to international commerce and antithetical to freedom
167. See Contiguous Zone of the United States, Proclamation 7219, 35 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. DOC. 1684 (Sept. 2, 1999). 
168. See LOSC, supra note 84, arts. 87(2), 58(1). 
169. Where there are clear grounds for believing that a vessel navigating in the
territorial sea of a state has, during its passage therein, violated laws and regulations
of that state adopted in accordance with this convention or applicable international 
rules and standards for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from 
vessels, that state, without prejudice to the application of the relevant provisions of
Part II, section 3 [i.e. innocent passage] may undertake physical inspection of 
the vessel relating to the violation and may, where the evidence so warrants,
institute proceedings, including detention of the vessel.
Id. art. 220(2). 
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of navigation.  Furthermore, any proclamation might only serve to
highlight the vulnerability to attack, and its deterrent effect may not 
inhibit politically motivated, non-state actors. 
D. Establish a Single Point of Contact to Monitor     
Threatening Behavior 
International associations and consortiums like the International Cable 
Protection Committee (ICPC)170, the North American Submarine Cable 
Association (NASCA),171 and the Submarine Cable Improvement Group 
(SCIG),172 all have a strong interest in being able to maintain and protect
their cables. However, a strong, central monitoring authority—one that 
monitors all cable and pipeline disruptions and is connected to defense 
ministries around the world—is acutely lacking.
In the United States, “the fundamental orientation of the Homeland 
Security Act regarding protection of this infrastructure is a voluntary one 
of cooperation among all levels of government and private owners and 
170.  The ICPC has 106 Members from over 50 countries who are major owners
or operators of submarine cables. The purpose of the ICPC is to help safeguard 
the submarine cable portions of power and telecommunications networks from 
human and natural hazards. This is achieved by sharing expert knowledge and
promoting ideas that are beneficial to the protection of submarine cable systems 
worldwide. 
About the ICPC, ICPC, http://www.iscpc.org/information/About_ICPC.htm (last visited July
24, 2010). 
171. NASCA is a non-profit association of submarine cable owners, submarine cable
maintenance authorities, and prime contractors for submarine cable systems. See NASCA, 
http://www.n-a-s-c-a.org (last visited July 24, 2010).  NASCA’s members include: Alaska 
United Fiber System Partnership; Alcatel-Lucent Submarine Networks; Apollo Submarine
Cable System Ltd.; AT&T Corp.; Brasil Telecom of America, Inc./GlobeNet; Global Crossing 
Ltd.; Columbia Ventures Corporation; Columbus Networks, Inc.; Global Marine Systems
Ltd.; Hibernia Atlantic; Level (3) Communications, LLC; New World Network, USA,
Inc.; Southern Cross Cable Network; Sprint Nextel Corp.; Tyco Telecommunications (US) 
Inc; Verizon Communications, Inc.; and VSNL International, Inc.  See NASCA Member
Companies, NASCA, http://www.n-a-s-c-a-.org/member-companies-1 (last visited Aug. 15, 
2010).
172. [SCIG] was formed in 1995 by four industry leaders: Alcatel Submarine 
Networks, Global Marine Systems Ltd, Kokusai Cable Ship Co., Ltd. and Tyco
Telecommunications (U.S.) Inc., ‘to develop cost-effective approaches and
solutions to improve cable reliability and to communicate these to relevant 
international parties.’  Collectively, the four companies and their predecessors 
have led the undersea cable industry for over a century. The SCIG has developed 
and distributed guidelines for cable engineering, cable burial depths and for the
burial of cable in deepwater.  In addition, the Group has published several papers
on cable faults and other topics. 
SUBOPTIC, http://www.suboptic.org/About-SubOptic/Industry-Affiliations.aspx (last visited
Sept. 15, 2010). 
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operators of infrastructure.”173  Under the current approach, private
entities have to be willing to share information regarding their 
vulnerabilities and security measures with government, which turns on 
their trust that such sensitive information will not be divulged or used
against them.174  The main obstacles to forming an effective authority in 
the United States and abroad thus become cost and information sharing. 
A strong, viable international authority necessitates costly policing and 
significant access to proprietary and sensitive information, both of which
require a collective mandate. 
Recent U.S. government action on cyber-space security provides a 
blueprint for germinating such centralized authority.  First, order a 
security review on the vulnerability of critical undersea infrastructure to 
undersea attack, just as President Barack Obama ordered a sixty day
cyber-space policy review in February 2009.  Second, use the review 
team’s recommendations to signal new policy imperatives.  President
Obama did precisely this when, as recommended, he appointed a cyber-
security official and a new office to coordinate the nation’s cyber-
security policy.  Third, envelope these new policy imperatives in a
public awareness campaign to invoke a collective call to action while 
simultaneously signaling to perpetrators that any covert attack will be 
tracked, unmasked, and met with proportionate retaliation.  The White 
House cyber report said: 
the nation must get serious and coordinate action to secure the government’s vulnerable 
computer infrastructure, and calls upon state, local and tribal governments to elevate 
cyber-security as an issue . . . [It] also suggests updating the national strategy
for cyber-security and incident response, implementing a national education 
campaign about cyber-threats, and building an identity management vision for 
the country, among several other goals.175 
Fourth, vest the new authority with meaningful police power.  The White
House cyber review, for example, was accompanied by the introduction of
the Cybersecurity Act in the U.S. Senate,176 which: 
173. James W. Conrad, Jr., Information Protection, in HOMELAND SECURITY 95, 
118–19 (Joe D. Whitley & Lynne K Zusman eds., 2009). 
174. See id. (author cites the Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002 (CIIA)
as a step to encourage such sharing within the United States). See also 6 U.S.C. §§ 131– 
134 (2009).
175. Matt Williams, National Cyber-Security Report Is a Call to Action, GOV’T TECH., 
available at http://www.govtech.com/gt/articles/691709 (last visited June 6, 2010). 
176. See S. 773, 111th Cong. (2009). 
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would establish a new Cybersecurity Advisory Panel within the White House 
and streamline the cybersecurity effort through all levels of government.  The 
bill also calls on the Department of Commerce to establish and maintain a
clearinghouse on information related to cybsecurity threat and vulnerability
information to public and private infrastructure deemed “critical” by the President.
The Secretary of Commerce would be given access to this information “without 
regard to any provision of law, regulation, rule, or policy restricting such access.” 
The bill would also give the President new authority to “declare a cybersecurity
emergency and order the limitation or shutdown of Internet traffic to and from
any compromised Federal Government or United States critical infrastructure
information system or network.177 
The mandate for greater vigilance and protection of U.S. cyber assets
was initiated by the President’s review, and culminated in proposals for 
more centralized control.  There is no reason why a similar directive
cannot be issued for the cables through which cyber pulses traverse. 
E. Establish Safety Zones 
Professor Stuart Kaye has proffered the following compromise
solutions:
In the context of pipelines and cables, it may be appropriate to revisit the proposal 
originally considered by the ILC in the 1950s, and permit the creation of prohibited
areas for anchoring.  These would not restrict navigation, but would prevent 
vessels from loitering in the immediate vicinity of a pipeline or cable.  The 
width of such a zone could be relatively modest, and probably be no more than
500 meters at best.  [However,] States were reluctant to accept such a concept in 
1958, and it is likely that they would still be reluctant over fears of harm to 
freedom of navigation. . . . 
. . . .
If widening a safety zone is not an option, then widening the zone for certain
purposes might produce a more acceptable balance of interests.  A zone of three 
nautical miles width acting as a warning zone, rather than a navigation exclusion
zone, might present a way forward.  Vessels without sovereign immunity could
be advised to avoid such zones, and upon entry render themselves obliged to
report detailed information concerning their intentions, cargo, and destination.
Failure to report would render the vessel liable to be boarded.  The non-application
of this to sovereign immune vessels, principally warships, might help allay
concerns over freedom of navigation.178 
The Australian Communications and Media Authority appears to have
already acted on this proposal by declaring a protection zone off Perth, 
Western Australia for the SEA-ME-WE 3 submarine communications 
177. S.773: Cyber Security Act of 2009, OPENCONGRESS, http://www.opencongress. 
org/bill/111-s773/show (last visited June 6, 2010). 
178. Kaye, supra note 108, at 421–22. 
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cable.179  Activities that could damage the cable, such as trawling or 
anchoring, are restricted or prohibited within one nautical mile of the 
cable to a depth of 2,000 meters, fifty-one nautical miles from shore.180 
Interestingly, the Australian Authority has also stiffened the penalty for
contravening this restriction: $66,000 (AUS) and/or ten years
imprisonment. 
The recurring dilemma here is one of competing interests: security of
critical infrastructure versus freedom of navigation and maintaining 
precise locations secret.  Restricting transit or loitering within a 
prescribed distance from charted cables and pipelines (e.g., 2,000 yards) 
might ease the burden of attributing mal intent.  UUVs entering the
secure zone could be detected with passive sensors and possibly disabled. 
More consequentially, impeding mother ships from maneuvering in 
close proximity to undersea infrastructure would force attackers to rely
on the more dubious control and endurance of long-range, untethered 
UUVs to execute any underwater nefariousness. 
Nevertheless, publicizing the location of undersea cables and pipelines 
may only serve to inform attackers.  As prevalent as this locating
information appears in the public domain, many precise coordinates 
remain sheathed in corporate secrecy.  And without doubt, restrictions 
on the freedoms of navigation that undergird the LOSC will be 
politically unsavory.
Perhaps, in spite of these drawbacks, critical undersea infrastructure,
like cyber security, is so vital as to necessitate amending the LOSC’s
emphasis on freedom of navigation.  This reasoning comports with the 
Obama administration’s renewed emphasis on cyber security, yet runs
counter to its open defense of unfettered internet access around 
the globe. Ongoing international cyber security debates engender a 
classic trade-off between individual liberties and collective security,181 
179. See Submarine Telecommunications Cable, supra note 46. See also Australian
Communications and Media Authority (ACMA), WA Protection Zone, http://www.acma.
gov.au/WEB/STANDARD/pc=PC_100868 (select "Map–Perth Protection Zone" link) (last 
visited Nov. 3, 2010), infra Attachment D. 
180. See id. 
181. See, e.g., Mark Landler & Edward Wong, China Rebuffs Clinton on Internet 
Warning, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2010, at A4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/
01/23/world/asia/23china.html: 
The Obama administration . . . repeated its demand that Beijing provide a more
detailed response to Google’s allegations that its computer network had been 
infiltrated by hackers based in China. But the United States held off lodging a 
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like notions of buffering undersea pipelines and cables from untoward
encroachment.
F. Clarification of Piracy Under the LOSC 
Finally, there is temporal ripeness to treat undersea pirates as hostes
humani generis. Critical infrastructure below the waterline is often
beyond national jurisdiction and remote from the state of affiliation. 
Therefore, it should be unambiguously incorporated into the LOSC 
definition of piracy along with ocean platforms.  The two-vessel
requirement and the private ends limitation should be eliminated to deter 
signatory states and their inhabitants from looting and possibly inciting 
economic and environmental shock at the margins of antiquated
definitions.
As in several recommendations above, the United States can take the 
lead in updating the LOSC to account for technology trends and the 
changing dynamics of modern threats and defenses.  The United States
can drive this discourse by ratifying the LOSC.  Further, it can condition 
ratification on the incorporation of security amendments, including an 
updated definition of piracy.
The modification of this one definition may not assist in attributing a 
surreptitious attack to its culprits, but could be the foundation for a more 
coordinated and enforceable response in the global commons. As in
declaring safety zones around pipeline and cable routes, the aim would
not be to thwart the possibility of attacks as much as to deter attacks 
through the specter of tough international sanctions.  And if international 
responses are still deemed too tepid and ginger in punishing pirates, then
a revised definition could at least provide affected flag states with a
recognized prerogative to prosecute offenders akin to a coastal state’s 
sovereignty within its territorial waters.
formal diplomatic protest, suggesting that administration officials were
still uncertain about how hard to push China on the matter. . . . Beijing and 
Washington both initially tried to treat the Google case as mainly a commercial
dispute. But [a Secretary of State speech on Internet freedom], with its cold 
war undertones, has catapulted the dispute from the realm of technology and
cybersecurity to one of fundamental freedoms. 
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VII. CONCLUSION
Submarine cables and pipelines are vulnerable assets in the global 
commons.182  Their protection from undersea attack is a real prescriptive
and enforcement challenge because of our extreme reliance on this
critical infrastructure; its multi-jurisdictional span beyond territorial
seas; the availability of precise locational coordinates; the opaque 
environment below the waterline; and the accessibility to commercial-
grade vehicles that can exploit this environment and inflict disproportionate
harm. 
The opaque environment and the accessibility to UUVs set this 
challenge apart from challenges above the water’s surface to flagged 
vessels and platforms.  As with cyber threats, this necessitates an
effective deterrence policy to compensate for an inability to pinpoint
suspected culprits. Not only do legal shortcomings in jurisdiction and 
security enforcement float above the surface, but arguably more sinister 
shortcomings lurk below.  These threats also require an even more
delicate balance between disclosure and secrecy, and between freedom
of navigation and reasonable restraints for collective security. 
In the end, whatever vigor is applied towards cyber security, and
whatever balance is struck for internet freedoms should be matched by 
securing the very cables that transport this life-blood of commerce.
Likewise, investment in energy independence should correspond to the
security of the very arteries that enable and spur offshore energy 
exploration.
The underwater environment may be opaque and the potential 
international solutions may be equally murky, but on account of this 
confluence of vulnerabilities, threats and legal shortcomings, it is 
imperative to address this unique challenge and devise solutions with
sufficiently deliberate haste so as to deter attacks and provide for redress
if deterrence proves ineffective.  
182. See Stuart Kaye, Threats From the Global Commons: Problems of Jurisdiction
and Enforcement, 83 INT’L LAW STUDIES 69, 73 (2007). 
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